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1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT		
2	SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW		
3	J.T. COLBY & COMPANY, IN al.,	C., et	
4	Plaintiff	S .	
5	v.	<i>、</i>	11 CV 4060 (DLC)
6	APPLE INC.,		11 00 1000 (210)
7	Defendant.		
8			
9		X	New York, N.Y. April 27, 2012
10			3:40 p.m.
11	Before:		
12	HON. DENISE COTE,		
13			District Judge
14	APPEARANCES		
15 16	ALLEGAERT BERGER & VOGEL Attorneys for Plaintiffs PARTHA PRATIM CHATTORAJ		
17	QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN LLP		
18	Attorneys for Plaintiffs ROBERT LLOYD RASKOPF		
19	KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP		
20	Attorneys for Defendant DALE MARGARET CENDALI		
21	CLAUDIA ELIZABETH RAY BONNIE LEIGH JARRETT		
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(In open court; case called)

THE COURT: Welcome, everyone.

This case has been reassigned to me. I know you had a February 27th conference with Judge Forrest. I have read the transcript of that conference. I know there's a governing scheduling order in this case, with discovery to be concluded June 15th, a summary judgment motion to be fully submitted July 27th, and a trial date of October 22nd. A protective order has been issued in this case.

I have a dispute with respect to discovery issues, and those are principally brought on by the letter from defense counsel. Plaintiff's counsel, in addition, raises the issue of a desire to file an amended complaint. There is a dispute about whether or not consent will be given to that and the impact it might have on any schedule that now exists in this case.

There was a motion to withdraw as counsel of record for the plaintiffs, and a reply declaration came in on that motion, indicating that the motion is now moot. I don't know that that's actually true. I think there probably is still a motion for Manatt Phelps to withdraw and in fact to be replaced by plaintiff's counsel who are here.

Is a lawyer for Manatt Phelps present in the courtroom?

MR. CHATTORAJ: I was informed by my colleagues at

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Manatt Phelps that they will not be here today.

THE COURT: It would have been a courtesy to the Court for them to be present. Thank you.

MR. CHATTORAJ: I will convey that to them, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Welcome, counsel for the plaintiffs, Mr. -- is it Chattoraj?

MR. CHATTORAJ: That's correct, your Honor, perfect.

THE COURT: Thank you.

-- and Mr. Raskopf.

I plan to address any outstanding issues. include who pays for the hard drive being processed, confirmation that the hard drive is the only source of the plaintiff's documents, scheduling of expert reports, scheduling of the plaintiff's deposition, scheduling of the inspection of the plaintiff's quote-unquote warehouse, and of course the amended complaint issue.

With respect to the hard drive issue, I've read the parties' submissions on that. Does anyone have anything they want to add briefly? Mr. Chattoraj?

MR. CHATTORAJ: Well, your Honor, it's my understanding, based on my review of the correspondence between the parties, that the hard drive cost-shifting issue is the basis for Apple's counsel not to consent to the Manatt Phelps

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firm's motion to withdraw. That may well be buttressed by the fact that we circulated fully executed stipulation to substitute counsel yesterday, which has not been executed by Apple's counsel.

So I suppose that my preference, unusually for plaintiff, would be to let Ms. Cendali explain her understanding of why it is that my client should pay the costs associated with that hard drive, and then I can respond. reason --

THE COURT: She's already done that on paper. I think this has been addressed on paper by both sides.

MR. CHATTORAJ: Very well, your Honor.

THE COURT: I don't need any additional oral statement, but I wanted to give you the opportunity to say anything if you'd like to.

MR. CHATTORAJ: Yes. What I would like to say about it is that I am indeed new counsel. I may well not have made the same strategic judgment as my predecessors, in providing this hard drive to defense counsel. It would have been my preference to actually engage an e-discovery vendor and to process that hard drive myself and review it before providing it to the defense counsel.

Now, to some degree, that ship has sailed, and I recognize that, and I certainly don't want to do anything to impede the moving forward of the case and to move us as quickly

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as possible toward the October 22nd trial date.

That being said -- I'm mainly inferring this, but also based on conversations with my predecessor -- I understand that the reason that the hard drive was provided to defense counsel was because plaintiffs didn't wish to incur the cost of actually doing the processing and so on. For defense counsel now to say, well, this isn't fair, you have to pay the cost of doing this, sort of defeats the purpose of providing it.

So all I would say is, if the Court is inclined to shift the costs in the way that defense counsel wishes, my request, as an incoming counsel, would be to permit us to get the hard drive back, perhaps get a certification from defense counsel that they destroyed any copies and don't have any copies, and ideally certification that they have not yet begun to review it in light of their stated problem with the expense, and that we would then process it in the ordinary course. would be my fallback position if my predecessor's counsel's position is not adopted by the Court.

THE COURT: If what position is not adopted?

MR. CHATTORAJ: My predecessor's view was that Apple's counsel should pay the money, process it, produce information and provide a copy set to us, to plaintiffs.

> THE COURT: Thank you.

That is his position. MR. CHATTORAJ: Thank you.

THE COURT: Ms. Cendali.

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MS. CENDALI: Your Honor, not at the last conference, whose transcript you alluded to, but the conference before that, when the hard drive came up, I think the record was clear that Judge Forrest said you need to comply with discovery, plaintiff, you're the plaintiff in this case, you need to act like the plaintiff, you can't just sit there and do nothing because new counsel is coming in, and you have to produce your documents. And they said, OK. And she gave a deadline, and she said to them, if you're not going to produce by that deadline, you need to give the hard drive to Ms. Cendali. they said OK.

There was no discussion whatsoever about who would bear the cost of that. And we all read the Zubalake case, and we all know that there needs to be a motion for that. As we said in our papers, it seems a little unseemly and usual -- we have Manatt, we have two new firms, we have a litigation planning firm, we have Mr. Colby, the sole proprietor of plaintiffs, who has apparently homes on Shelter Island and Park Avenue -- it seems odd for Apple having to fund its own lawsuit against itself. We believe that they should pay that cost. It's already at the e-discovery vendor, they're working through it. It was delivered, the output, but we do think, it's their responsibility and their cost.

There's been no showing of any of the factors that would rise to cost-sharing.

THE COURT: I've looked at the transcript of the February 27th conference and in particular at page 36 of that conference, where the hard drive issue does come up. I agree that there wasn't any specific or explicit discussion of the cost-shifting issue, but the plaintiff was clearly given the opportunity to process and produce responsive documents to the defendant, chose not to, chose instead to provide the entire hard drive to the defendant. I am not going to shift the cost to the defendant of the processing of the hard drive. Apple may serve an invoice on the plaintiff, and that must be paid

Can you confirm, Mr. Chattoraj, that the only source of the plaintiff's documents is the hard drive?

within two weeks of service of the invoice.

MR. CHATTORAJ: Your Honor, at this time I'm not in a position to make that representation. I do believe in fact that there are hard copy documents that may exist that would not be within that hard drive.

THE COURT: And that were responsive to the discovery demands already served on the plaintiff?

MR. CHATTORAJ: I myself have not participated in a search for documents, your Honor, so it would be speculation on my part, so I'm not comfortable making a representation to the Court based on mere speculation.

THE COURT: Thank you very much.

I'm going to require any document production that

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needs to be made to comply with the duties imposed by the Federal Rules, be completed by next Friday. That would be May 4th.

Let's set a schedule for service of expert reports.

Is the plaintiff intending to call experts? I know there was a discussion at the February 27th conference of three potential kinds of experts. Is the plaintiff intending to call experts?

MR. CHATTORAJ: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: In what fields?

MR. CHATTORAJ: We will be calling an expert in to assess damages and evaluation of intellectual property at issue. We will be calling an expert on marketing and consumer psychology, and will be -- it is currently something that we are discussing, I don't want to make a commitment to this because we have just gotten into the case strategic issue, but if we were to call a third expert, it would be an industry custom and practice expert on trademark search.

Your Honor --

THE COURT: Let me ask the defendants: Other than rebuttal experts, is the defendant planning to call any expert on an issue on which the defendant bears the burden of proof?

MS. CENDALI: I don't think we bear the burden of proof on it, but I know that plaintiffs apparently are not calling a survey expert, which is typically the case in trademark cases. We think there are obvious reasons why

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they're not planning on calling a survey expert, so most likely we might want to do so affirmatively.

Your Honor, I don't know if this is the right time, but as you're talking about service and expert reports, I did want to discuss the issue of a schedule and the trial date, if the Court will hear me on that.

THE COURT: Have the parties discussed that with each other --

MS. CENDALI: No.

THE COURT: -- the scheduling issues?

MS. CENDALI: We didn't know until yesterday that they were definitely coming in. Since January there's been talk that some firm or firms were going to come in. The last communication we heard was in an email to Judge Forrest to the effect that they were still negotiating with their litigation funding firm, so it wasn't until yesterday that counsel appeared.

It seems most productive for us to initially have a meet-and-confer and to try to work out a sensible schedule. As you can tell from the transcripts, your Honor, initially Apple was doing everything it could to try to meet the existing schedule, but as absolutely nothing has happened, we're now at the point of where we have extreme prejudice; we have to cram six months of discovery into a very short period of time.

> We're going to take a recess for about ten THE COURT:

minutes. So, Counsel, I'm going to ask you to meet and confer with respect to the issues that I have listed and any issues you want to add to the list. And I will take this criminal matter and then we'll reconvene.

MS. CENDALI: May we go out in the hallway, your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes.

MS. CENDALI: Thank you.

MR. RASKOPF: Thank you, your Honor.

(Recess)

THE COURT: So Ms. Cendali, do you have agreement?

MS. CENDALI: Yes, your Honor. We have had the most productive ten minutes we have had in this case so far.

We agree that, with your Honor's permission obviously, that it would make sense to move the trial date, given the state of discovery. What we have agreed to, for your Honor's consideration, is a proposed schedule for the close of fact discovery for August 15th; affirmative expert reports,

September 15th; rebuttal expert reports, October 26th; close of expert discovery, November 23rd, Daubert motions, summary judgment motions, dispositive motions, et cetera,

December 21st; opposition briefs to such motions, January 25th, taking into account the holidays; reply briefs to such motions,

February 5th; and then beyond that, we thought it was really up to you. Some judges say, I'll give you a trial date once I

know what I want to do at that point. That's actually what we would prefer, but that's one thing that we agreed to.

We have also discussed, and I can report on, the status of various other discovery issues that you mentioned that relate to our letter. Would you like me to do that at all once?

THE COURT: Sure.

MS. CENDALI: OK.

With regard to the amended complaint, we had consented to the draft that we had been shown by Manatt, but new counsel has said that they would like the opportunity to review the pleadings and may do a different amendment, and we have agreed that if and when they do that, we will look at it and we'll see where we are as to whether we consent or not.

With regard to the deposition of Mr. Colby, at the time of the letter we were needing a hard date because we didn't get the hard date. At this point we, Apple, are not asking to set a date certain for his deposition today, on the theory that we need to see what the documents will show and that we will hopefully amicably reach a mutually agreeable date with new counsel. They have indicated that they will produce him. And until, and if, there's an issue, we don't need you to get into that level of minutia.

With regard to the issue of the inspection, what we want is to inspect both of Mr. Colby's and his company's

premises. There is the New York address, which is the address in the complaint, and on their website is their business address, and then we have learned there is also his Shelter Island address, which apparently where he — also is perhaps referred to for his website. So we want to inspect both of those premises and take video and a picture of the business premises and see what's there, see what signage is up, see if it really is a business premise or not, and the like.

Previous counsel had had two objections to that. One of them was that they didn't want us to go to the New York address. And they said, well, it's not really a business address. And we said, well, since it's the address in the complaint and in your website, it would be relevant to our overall position that this is an opportunist plaintiff, an opportunist who's trying to get a windfall from Apple; we'd like to see what's at that address regardless.

And then the second issue was the plaintiff's previous counsel had said we'd be limited to only taking photographs of books as opposed to something else about the premises. And our position was, we shouldn't be so limited. Of course rights would be reserved for whatever motions in limine might be appropriate, but if there is or isn't signage or anything else like that, I think we're entitled to present that.

We raised both of these issues with new counsel.

Correct me if I am wrong, but they were not willing to commit

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to this issue. We are concerned about potential spoliation and other issues with regard to this. We have been pressing for this for a long time. So we really would like the right, and we respectfully request that the Court issue an order letting us inspect both premises along the lines that I just said.

THE COURT: Mr. Chattoraj?

MR. CHATTORAJ: Yes, your Honor. My view is that to the extent that Apple is raising what we view as sort of a spurious issue as to whether or not my client has a bona fide business, we think in the first instance document production, much of which will probably be on this hard drive, will clearly show a large volume of sales and large volumes of dollars and books being sold year in and year out over a very long period of time, in fact, a much greater period of time than that within which Apple has sold books. So, to the extent that the effort is to show up at my client's business addresses and sort of try to make his business look like a sort of less than it is, in this era of sort of virtual businesses and online businesses, it's not clear to me why these inspections are necessary.

That being said, based on my somewhat limited conversations with my client and my predecessor, I just feel like -- when I said I wasn't willing to commit, it's because I just don't have a well articulated understanding of the basis of the objections. My feeling is that this case is going to be

decided based on, for example, the documents and the other evidence showing the sales and so on. And I think that this allegation that it's a de minimis business is going to rapidly fall by the wayside once we actually get into the discovery.

But at the same time, as a trial lawyer, I really think that you could do a lot with photographs that could be helpful to both sides, so I don't have strong feelings about it. And my view is simply that I'd like to reserve judgment on withdrawing objections until I at least have a better understanding of what those objections are. I think I'd be doing a disservice to my client.

THE COURT: That's fair enough, Mr. Chattoraj. I'll let you notify Ms. Cendali about your position on Tuesday. And if there remains a dispute on this, I'll hear counsel later in the week and we'll resolve this next week. You should assume that any inspection will take place the following week; that is ordered. So we'll get the inspection done and behind us if there's going to be one.

MR. CHATTORAJ: Very well, your Honor. Thank you.
THE COURT: Good.

Ms. Cendali, did you have a further report to me?

MS. CENDALI: Yes. The last issue we had just started to talk about, but you had asked to tee up with you whatever else there was, and this issue wasn't specifically in the

letters, I don't think, because it was more recent, and that

is, Manatt served objections to our 30(b)(6) request, and they also served objections to our RFA request. And in every single case they put the same identical boilerplate paragraph objecting to give us any information. So we would serve an RFA, "admit that you have not sold books," and their objection would be, they don't have sufficient information to admit or deny.

Now, part of me would just like to move for summary judgment immediately on this, but I don't know if that will win the day at the end of the day. So I'm not quite sure what to do about this. Perhaps the most logical thing to do, though — it seems not fair and an unnecessary expense for Apple to have to give them a do-over on these objections, but I do think they were improper, and either they should do them over or we would like some motion practice with regard to them.

THE COURT: OK, we will all strive mightily to avoid motion practice.

So why don't we use the May 4th date, where the document production is being perfected, to also allow any amended objections or discovery responses generally. So you will be in a better position a week from today, Ms. Cendali, to know whether or not the objections to the requests you have made merit further discussion with the Court.

MS. CENDALI: I think, your Honor, that that's our list of our productive meeting. Plaintiff may have others but

up, and everyone has reserved all rights to meet and confer on

that's where we are. We realize going forward that everyone has reserved rights to -- new issues we fully expect will come

4 those issues.

THE COURT: Let me talk a little bit about my procedures.

If you have a discovery dispute, you have to meet and confer and try to resolve it in good faith. If you still have a dispute, write me a letter no longer than — my letters are even shorter than Judge Forrest's — two pages, but in that letter make sure that you indicate that you have met and conferred and been unable to resolve the issue. And then I'll get you on the phone or, if it seems a terribly complex issue, we will meet in court and try to resolve it and I will give you a ruling. I may not wait for a response letter; I may just get you on the phone.

I'm going to adopt the proposed schedule. I'm not going to schedule a pretrial order. But if the parties do not end up filing summary judgment motions, I want letters on November 23rd indicating that there will be no summary judgment practice, in which case I'll get out a separate scheduling order for a pretrial order.

I'm going to act from this point on as if the plaintiff is bound by all actions taken by his current counsel. Should he change counsel yet again, we're not going to allow

another round of amended pleadings or revised discovery requests or anything else.

We need an end date with respect to the amendment of pleadings. And why don't I give plaintiff's counsel an additional week beyond May 4th, so May 11th, for the filing of any amended pleading.

I take it nobody needs to join any additional party, but that May 11th date is going to be for amendment and joinder, so that we know as of that date the pleadings are closed.

I think this is a case in which probably it makes sense to have expert discovery before summary judgment practice, but I just want to flag that as an issue. If counsel, after they proceed further in this case, think that it would be more efficient and cost effective to have a summary judgment motion before expert discovery, that's fine with me.

Also, if there's an immediate summary judgment that can be filed on a discrete issue that a party thinks that I can grant even now, today, before discovery, fact discovery, is completed, I'd be open to that, if there's something that would help the parties understand the law that will be applied here and the likelihood of success, even if it doesn't fully resolve the case.

Mr. Chattoraj, are there any additional issues that you would like to raise at today's conference?

MR. CHATTORAJ: Yes, your Honor. Just a few housekeeping issues, if I may.

I know that your Honor's individual practices require that the parties provide a courtesy copy set of the pleadings in advance of the conference. Although this is not a preliminary conference, it is our first conference before you, and I have brought a courtesy copy set since we were just came in yesterday.

THE COURT: Thank you. You may hand it up.

MR. CHATTORAJ: I will just show my adversary.

MS. CENDALI: I'm convinced that is what it is. Thank you, Mr. Chattoraj.

MR. CHATTORAJ: The only change is the stamp that says "Courtesy Copy" on the upper right-hand corner of both documents. There are a lot of exhibits, so it might be helpful.

Another issue is the question of the substitution of counsel. As you correctly pointed out, your Honor, there is currently before the Court a motion by Manatt Phelps to withdraw. It is the position of Manatt Phelps, as I understand it, that it is a moot motion because of our appearing in the case. And as I mentioned at the outset of today's conference, we are prepared to enter into stipulation with opposing counsel substituting us, which we could then hand up right now. I even have the originals for your Honor's endorsement, and was

wondering if that is something that we should do today.

MS. CENDALI: Your Honor, we have consented to the substitution. People are allowed to pick their attorneys of choice. I have to say, before everything happened yesterday, our initial thought for this conference was to come here requesting sanctions because it's been a sorry, tedious state the past four months, where my client has had the unnecessary expense of depositions confirmed, depositions canceled, the panoply of different events.

It does seem bothersome to me, as an officer of the court, that when Judge Forrest was clear that Manatt still had a responsibility and had to move forward with the case, that it chose not to, and it doesn't seem right that they effectively took for themselves the stay that they had put in their motion papers.

That being said, I'm certainly powerless to do anything about it. Whether some form of sanction might be appropriate, I certainly could believe that's the case, but I understand that it's a difficult situation and sanctions are not issued lightly.

THE COURT: Well, let me just say that I will accept the appearance of incoming counsel for the plaintiff. I don't consider the motion by Manatt moot. Instead, I'm going to grant the motion and grant their request to withdraw on the case.

And the history of the failures with respect to the plaintiff pursuing discovery diligently, having filed the case and imposing burdens on defense counsel through his failure to act as you would want a plaintiff to act, to prosecute his own claims diligently, it's part of the history in this case. I'm not going to ask for a sanctions motion now. You have the rights to file whatever you want to file, but I think the appropriate way, from my point of view, to address this is to just recognize it's the history in the case, to have every hope and confidence that none of that will be repeated, and that we move forward here towards the merits. But if something happens again and the issue appears in front of us and looms large and defense counsel want to bring a motion, they can draw on that whole history.

Mr. Chattoraj, I don't know if I finished asking you if you had any other issues.

MR. CHATTORAJ: I did have a couple of small issues.

For purposes of the record, let me be clear: I'm not sure of what communications took place before we appeared in this matter, but we have not ruled out using a survey expert. When I referred earlier to a marketing and consumer psychology expert, it was within my contemplation that a survey might be done. All I can say is, at this juncture I'm not sure whether we'll do a survey or not, but I wouldn't want to mislead either Ms. Cendali or the Court into thinking that we're not doing a

survey as part of the expert process. It's just not clear right now.

Also --

THE COURT: Can I interrupt?

MR. CHATTORAJ: Yes, you may.

THE COURT: We have sophisticated counsel on both sides. I know you are proposing a date, and I will get out a scheduling order of the filing of expert motions

September 15th. I expect it will be helpful to both sides to work on interim scheduling dates with respect to expert discovery where you do more firmly advise each other of the areas and perhaps the identity of experts. And I'm going to leave that for you to discuss among yourselves.

MR. CHATTORAJ: Thank you, your Honor. That makes a lot of sense to us.

Just on some specific discovery issues: I will say —
I have to say this because I'm very proud of myself — in the
last 24 hours I basically reviewed the entirety of Apple's
production to date. It was about 15,000 pages. Without going
into detail, because I know that a substantive argument isn't
welcome at this time and not appropriate, I did discern
numerous deficiencies specifically with respect to certain
information that we feel we are entitled to. During the
meet—and—confer we just had, I raised some of these issues and
indicated we hoped to meet and confer on these issues; and if

that failed, we would have to have motion practice.

I was informed some of the issues may have already been resolved in the past. So what I need to do is go back and look at the conferences that took place before Judge Batts and then before Judge Forrest and then see, but certainly our view is that there is a substantial amount of material that needs to be produced for the parties even to have an idea of where they stand for purposes of resolution of the case, much less actually trying the case in a few months.

So I just wanted to prepare the Court for a very different tenor of the nature of discovery in this case. We certainly do intend to honor all of our discovery obligations and the dates set forth by the Court, but we also intend to redress what we see as pretty substantial deficiencies that really no one has brought to the Court's attention until now, in written form at least.

THE COURT: Well, the great unknown in this case is not whether Apple has an electronic books app, the great unknown in this case is, what does the plaintiff have and what are his rights based on that?

And to the extent you're alluding to discovery of

Apple with respect to profits and sales, you're going to have

to figure out a way to do that that is not burdensome, narrowly

focused, and does not become a significant imposition with

respect to the discovery, the nature of discovery in this case.

MR. CHATTORAJ: Your Honor, I promise you that the way I practice law is that I don't do discovery to cause pain -- we're just going to look for the truth -- and I completely accept that, your Honor.

THE COURT: OK.

MR. CHATTORAJ: What I would say is that there is — and I accept your Honor's view based on what's been presented in the past in this case, that the big issue is what my clients have. We're very confident in that. We do think that discovery, an additional discovery, needs to be done on the question of what Apple has. And we think that we will be able to present, based on discovery I have already seen and our continued investigation, that Apple's own rights to the alleged mark are quite infirm. But that I understand is also for another time.

What I'd also like to bring to the Court's attention is that we have received a ruling in which my client has, notwithstanding the page 36 of the transcript where Judge Forrest said that Apple would bear the burden, is going to be paying his adversary to do the processing of this hard drive, and in the context of sanction and so on, I think -- I've already expressed my view, perhaps improvidently, but that was a strategic misstep by my predecessor. In any event, I'd just like that to be taken into account. They are paying \$19,000 they certainly didn't expect to have to pay when they made the

choice to do what they did.

THE COURT: That is actually a very remarkably low number, in my mind. He filed the suit or the corporations filed the suit. It's expensive to engage in discovery. They made a choice.

MR. CHATTORAJ: Yes, your Honor. And, in fact, let me make it clear, I am not in any way questioning the equities at all. The reality is, as I said before, what I would want to do is take the hard drive back and perhaps spend more money doing the processing. I just want to make it clear, because it's not clear from the record in the transcript, we have engaged an ediscovery vendor — it's been the last two to three days — we have already uploaded all of the materials produced by all the parties. And so the point is we're doing this right now. Under the ESI requirements of the Federal Rules, under the Sedona Conference gold standard, things are going to change. We're doing this right.

THE COURT: Good.

MR. CHATTORAJ: And I just want to make it clear, we're going to spend the money that's necessary to do this right.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Chattoraj.

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$ CHATTORAJ: My colleague wishes to address the Court. I'm going to sit down --

THE COURT: OK.

MR. RASKOPF: -- unless that's not acceptable to your Honor, in which case I'll just whisper --

THE COURT: No, no. Mr. Raskopf, I'm afraid I have other matters waiting in chambers, so I'm happy to hear from you on anything that you think is important for me to hear.

MR. RASKOPF: One minute?

THE COURT: Sure.

(Pause)

MR. RASKOPF: When your Honor said no revised discovery requests, you said you weren't going to entertain any more discovery, I guess, this is an issue, it may be an issue — I just want to tee it up for your Honor, that it's a possibility that we will be coming back, because perhaps the way we framed discovery did not call for Apple to inform us of the revenues derived from the download of iBooks through the iBookstore and the iBook application. Obviously, as your Honor knows, one of the remedies, in a damages case brought in a matter like this, is disgorgement of the profits of the defendant.

So we were told that we are not going to get that information. And I know your Honor doesn't want to see seven different maybe ways that we could look at what the value of this case is, but we really want to try to settle it -- I'm here to get rid of this if I can -- but I know I'm not going to be able to do that if I'm not going to have access to the kinds

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of information that is, I think, just basic to a disgorgement of profits analysis.

So just I'm just bringing this to your Honor's

THE COURT: I think the idea that this case could be settled based on some understanding of the net profits from the Apple business, associated with the iBooks app, is a fascinating one. Again, I just want to say, I think the first bit of information that has to be developed is the plaintiff's rights and the nature and scope of the plaintiff's business.

MR. RASKOPF: Your Honor is going to see, I represent, that this is a legitimate business, and has been for a long time, and it's a real business. So this is not any -- it's a pretty classic reverse confusion case. It hasn't been -- the documents haven't been assembled very well, but it's a case that is capable of being well assembled, and we plan to do that.

So I'm not trying to suggest, oh, you know, just turn something over to me and then I'll make -- I'll try to get something worked out with you, without you understanding what my client's business is about.

THE COURT: Good. So, Mr. Raskopf, thank you for bringing to my attention the need to address the issue of settlement. I assume we need to see what's on the hard drive. I think we need to see, probably need a visual inspection of

the quote-unquote warehouse, at a minimum, and this document production on May 4th, and perhaps the plaintiff's deposition. But at that point, I expect the parties would be in a position to contemplate serious settlement discussions.

Do you agree, Mr. Raskopf?

MR. RASKOPF: I don't -- I agree that that is a definite step toward the settlement resolution. Now, if we're told, after our documents and testimony is shown to Apple, they still want to take this position that he is illegitimate, he's looking for a windfall or something like that, then obviously we're not going to settle it, because we believe that he is. But having said that, the other component of that is that we need to have some basic understanding of the revenue stream from the iBookstore, from books downloaded through the iBookstore and we don't have it and we were told we are not going to get it.

THE COURT: Well, I'll let you meet and confer about that. And I am sure you'll read the February 27th transcript, among other things, before that meet-and-confer process.

I'm going to issue a scheduling order that would have you contact the magistrate judge for settlement discussions to occur. And the contact time in my order will read, "you must contact the magistrate judge no later than June 29th." There will be an immediate order of reference, so you can contact the magistrate judge earlier.

Ms. Cendali, briefly, is there anything further we need to discuss from your point of view?

MS. CENDALI: No, your Honor. Thank you for your time.

THE COURT: And thank you very much, Mr. Raskopf, for bringing that additional issue to my attention.

MR. RASKOPF: Thanks. And we want to work it out, but we've got to just have some stuff, and we'll give them our stuff. That's what it's all about. We should have done it a long time ago, maybe both of us, and now we're going to resolve it, if we can.

THE COURT: Thank you very much.

MR. RASKOPF: You're welcome.

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